

# A macro-finance view on government debt and economic growth

Björn Ohl

Economic Institute  
Narodowy Bank Polski

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# Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Related literature
- 3 Model
- 4 Equilibrium
- 5 Results
- 6 Outlook

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# Introduction

## What does government debt do?

- ▶ What are the effects on the economy in the short and long run of a bond financed budget deficit caused by a tax cut?
- ▶ perennial and hotly debated question among economists and policy makers
- ▶ distinction between conventional (non-Ricardian) and Ricardian view on the effects of government debt, as in Elmendorf, Mankiw (1990), and Ball, Mankiw (1995)
- ▶ Ricardian view on government debt in Barro (1974)
- ▶ focus of my project on medium and long run effects in a non-Ricardian world

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# Related literature

a preliminary selection

- ▶ stylized OLG model in the spirit of Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965)
- ▶ government debt in neo-classical OLG model as in Diamond (1965) and many follow-up papers
- ▶ empirical finding of **financial crowding out** by Graham, Leary and Roberts (2013)
- ▶ importance of macro-financial linkages to understand aggregate outcomes, as in myriad of recent papers

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# The model in a nutshell

## Stochastic OLG economy populated with:

- ▶ two-period lived risk averse households
- ▶ one-period lived representative firm in each production sector
- ▶ two-period lived risk averse financial intermediaries
- ▶ infinitely-lived government



# The baseline model without growth

## Assumptions:

- ▶ **households:** inelastic aggregate labor supply and constant distribution across sectors
- ▶ **firms:** two production sectors
- ▶ **financial intermediaries:** risk-free government bond and two (productive) risky assets
- ▶ **government:** lump sum tax on young, government spending, and government bond

# Households

Households of generation  $t \geq 1$

- ▶ take as given prices  $(r_{t+1}, w_t^L, w_t^H)$  and lump sum tax  $\tau_t^t$
- ▶ unitary time endowment
- ▶ inelastic labor supply to each production sector
- ▶ choose consumption and savings plan  $(c_t^t, c_{t+1}^t, a_t^t)$  to maximize expected life-time utility

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t^t, c_{t+1}^t, a_t^t\}} & u(c_t^t) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[u(c_{t+1}^t)] \\ \text{s.t.} & c_t^t + a_t^t \leq w_t^L \bar{h}^L + w_t^H \bar{h}^H - \tau_t^t \\ & c_{t+1}^t \leq (1 + r_{t+1}) a_t^t \\ & 1 = \bar{h}^L + \bar{h}^H \end{aligned}$$

# Households

Initial old households of generation 0

- ▶ take as given wealth  $(1 + r_1)a_0^0$
- ▶ choose utility maximizing consumption plan  $c_1^0$

$$\max_{\{c_1^0\}} u(c_1^0)$$

$$\text{s.t. } c_1^0 \leq (1 + r_1)a_0^0$$

## Representative financial intermediary

- ▶ takes as given prices  $(r_{t+1}^b, (p_t^i, r_{t+1}^i)_i)$  and savings  $a_t^t$
- ▶ buys capital stocks  $(\tilde{k}_t^{i,d})_i$ , chooses investment plan  $(b_t^d, (x_t^i)_i)$  to maximize mean-variance utility of portfolio wealth
- ▶ in period  $t + 1$ , liquidates the portfolio and transfers wealth  $\Omega_{t+1}^t$  to old households

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{b_t^d, (\tilde{k}_t^{i,d}, x_t^i)_i\}} \quad & \mathbb{E}_t[\Omega_{t+1}^t] - \left(\frac{\gamma}{2}\right) \mathbb{V}_t[\Omega_{t+1}^t] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & b_t^d / (1 + r_t^b) + \sum p_t^i \tilde{k}_t^{i,d} + \sum x_t^i \leq a_t^t \\ & b_t^d + \sum r_{t+1}^i k_{t+1}^{i,s} + \sum p_{t+1}^i k_{t+1}^{i,s} = \Omega_{t+1}^t \\ & k_{t+1}^{i,s} = (1 - \delta_i) \tilde{k}_t^{i,d} + x_t^i \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ portfolio return follows from budget constraint and definition of portfolio wealth  $(1 + r_{t+1}) = \Omega_{t+1}^t / a_t^t$

# Initial old financial intermediary

- ▶ given investment plan from the past generates portfolio wealth

$$\Omega_1^0 = b_0^d + \sum r_1^i k_1^{i,s} + \sum p_1^i k_1^{i,s}$$

- ▶ initial old financial intermediary transfers realized portfolio wealth to households of generation 0

## Representative firms

- ▶ low-risk ( $i = L$ ) and high-risk ( $i = H$ ) production sector, each inhabited by a representative firm
- ▶ take as given prices  $(r_t^i, w_t^i)$  and sector-specific TFP-levels  $z_t^i$
- ▶ choose inputs to production  $(k_t^{i,d}, h_t^{i,d})$  to maximize profits

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{k_t^i, h_t^i\}} & y_t^i - \sum r_t^i k_t^{i,d} - \sum w_t^i h_t^{i,d} \\ \text{s.t.} & y_t^i = z_t^i f(k_t^{i,d}, h_t^{i,d}) \end{aligned}$$

# TFP-levels and technology shocks

- ▶ exogenous log-level of total factor productivity in each sector

$$\log(z_t^i) = (1 - \rho_z) \log(\bar{z}^i) + \rho_z \log(z_{t-1}^i) + \epsilon_t^i$$

- ▶ normally distributed technology shocks

$$\epsilon_t^i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)$$

- ▶ low-risk vs high-risk production sector

$$0 < \sigma_L < \sigma_H < \infty$$

- ▶ possibility of correlated technology shocks

$$\sigma_{L,H} \neq 0$$

# Government

- ▶ given initial level of outstanding debt  $b_0^s$
- ▶ exogenous sequence of government spending  $\{g_t\}_t$
- ▶ budget-feasible government policies  $(\tau_t^t, b_t^s)$  satisfy
  - 1 period- $t$  budget constraint

$$g_t + b_{t-1}^s \leq \tau_t^t + \frac{b_t^s}{(1 + r_t^b)}$$

- 2 no-Ponzi-game condition (a.e.)

$$\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \left( \prod_{j=0}^m R_j^b \right)^{-1} b_m = 0$$



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# Sequential Markets Equilibrium 1/2

## Definition (Sequential Markets Equilibrium)

Sequential Markets Equilibrium is **allocations** for households, firms, and financial intermediaries, **prices** and **government policies** such that:

- 1  $c_1^0$  solves the problem of households of generation 0
- 2  $\{(c_t^t, c_{t+1}^t, a_t^t)\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$  solves the problem of hh born in  $t \geq 1$
- 3  $\{(k_t^{i,d}, h_t^{i,d})_i\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$  solves the representative firms' problem
- 4  $\{b_t^d, (\tilde{k}_t^{i,d}, x_t^i)_i\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$  solves the financial intermediaries' problem
- 5  $\{(\tau_t^t, b_t^s)\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$  is a budget-feasible government policy

# Sequential Markets Equilibrium 2/2

## Definition (Sequential Markets Equilibrium, cont.)

6 i (Goods market)

$$c_t^{t-1} + c_t^t + \sum k_{t+1}^i + g_t = \sum y_t^i + \sum (1 - \delta_i) k_t^i$$

ii (Government bond market)

$$b_t^d = b_t^s$$

iii (Capital markets)

$$k_t^{i,d} = k_t^{i,s}$$

iv (Labor markets)

$$\begin{aligned} h_t^{L,d} &= (1 - \bar{h}^H) \\ h_t^{H,d} &= \bar{h}^H \end{aligned}$$

# Equilibrium

## Consumption & saving

- ▶ assumption: log-utility
- ▶ consumption of households of generation 0

$$c_1^0 = \Omega_1^0$$

- ▶ consumption and saving of households of generation  $t \geq 1$

$$c_t^t = \left( w_t^L(1 - \bar{h}^H) + w_t^H \bar{h}^H - \tau_t^t \right) / (1 + \beta)$$

$$a_t^t = \beta c_t^t$$

$$c_{t+1}^t = b_t + \sum r_{t+1}^i k_{t+1}^i$$

# Equilibrium

## Financial intermediaries and government

- ▶ define period  $t + 1$  excess returns after depreciation

$$\Delta_{t+1}^i = r_{t+1}^i - \delta_i - r_t^b$$

- ▶ in equilibrium  $((k_{t+1}^i)_i, r_t^b, b_t)$  solves the non-linear system of equations

$$k_{t+1}^i = \left[ \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta_{t+1}^i]}{\gamma \mathbb{V}_t[\Delta_{t+1}^i]} \right] - \left[ \frac{\text{Cov}_t[\Delta_{t+1}^i, \Delta_{t+1}^j]}{\gamma \mathbb{V}_t[\Delta_{t+1}^i]} \right] k_{t+1}^j$$

$$a_t^t = b_t / (1 + r_t^b) + \sum k_{t+1}^i$$


$$b_t = (1 + r_t^b) b_{t-1} + (1 + r_t^b) (g_t - \tau_t^t)$$

- ▶ motives for trading: speculation and diversification


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# Government debt has negative effect on long-run output . . .




... due to crowding out of private capital






# Government debt also changes composition of capital stock



# Financial crowding out of government debt



# How does financial crowding out operate in the model?


A partial equilibrium view

- ▶ assumption: independent technology shocks
- ▶ then **speculation** becomes the financial intermediaries' only motive for trading

$$k_{t+1}^i = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[r_{t+1}^i - \delta_i] - r_t^b}{\gamma \mathbb{V}_t[\Delta_{t+1}^i]} - \frac{\text{Cov}_t[\Delta_{t+1}^i, \Delta_{t+1}^j]}{\gamma \mathbb{V}_t[\Delta_{t+1}^i]} k_{t+1}^j$$

- ▶ an increase in government debt depresses the price of the government bond, increases the risk-free rate and leads to lower investment in risky capital
- ▶ the financial intermediary cuts her investment in the low-risk asset by more than in the high-risk asset since the former is a closer substitute for the risk-free government bond

# Can government debt increase average level of output? ... at the cost of larger output fluctuations?



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# Where to go from here?

## Some ideas for future work:

- 1 account for endogenous aggregate labor and non-constant distribution of labor across production sectors
- 2 comparison to C-CAPM model to clarify the role of financial intermediaries
- 3 inclusion of exogenous growth to discuss effects of public debt on growth
- 4 future projects:
  - i extension to quantifiable SOLG model usable for policy analysis
  - ii analysis of self-financing government debt policies